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harm must be proved in court before any compensatory damages can
be recovered, a task traditionally recognized as difficult.4 3
Yet a constitutional decision such as this was not made without
reason. 44 Despite the burdens for a particular plaintiff, he now has a
much better chance of "stinging" the media with a lawsuit. With the
privilege of publishers and broadcasters removed, a private citizen can
quite easily get a jury trial because the direction of recent cases has
been to view all libel as actionable per se. 45 Even if he doesn't recover
the damages allowed under the new standard and vindicate himself in
the process, he is still able to harass the defendant with a trial. 4 6
More importantly, Gertz reverses an attitude. The lower courts,4 7
plaintiff's attorneys, 4 8 law review commentators, 4 9 and even the
American Law Institute5 ° have assumed that the New York Times
privilege pre-empted the field of defamation except in the rarest of
cases. The decision will encourage potential plaintiffs and their attor-
neys to be bold, with the likely result that many more publishers and
broadcasters will find themselves defendants in libel actions in the
years ahead.
BRADFORD SWING
IRS PREVENTED FROM SEIZING DOCUMENTS:
ATTORNEY ASSERTS CLIENT'S FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
Dr. Mason, a taxpayer, was visited by Special Agents of the
Internal Revenue Service, who informed him that his tax returns were
under investigation. He immediately called his accountant, defendant
Candy, who advised Dr. Mason not to show any of his records to the
agents. Defendant Candy then called defendant Kasmir, an attorney,
43. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 765 (4th ed. 1971).
44. Justice Blackmun suggested that it was to resolve the "uncertainty" of a "sadly fraction-
ated" Court in Rosenbloom. 94 S. Ct. at 3014.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 569, at 59 (Tent. Draft No.
20, 1974). It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court's decision to prohibit imposition of
strict liability has removed the basis for the per se/per quod controversy, and thus has ended the
matter. Id.
46. Note that the burden of proving truth lies with the defendant once a per se case of libel
is established.
47. For a list of decisions by lower courts assuming the Rosenbloom plurality opinion to
have become the established law, see Note, Misinterpreting the Supreme Court: An Analysis of
How the Constitutional Privilege to Defame Has Been Incorrectly Expanded, 10 IDAHO L. REV.
213, 217 (1974).
48. On the attitude of attorneys, see id.
49. One commentator expressed support of the standard ultimately adopted in Gertz, but
seemed resigned to the inevitability of the Rosenbloom, or even of Justice Black's, standard.
Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 38, 227-28 (1971).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Chapter 24A, at 133-45 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
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who, at Candy's request, contacted Dr. Mason. Mason retained Kas-
mir as his attorney. The next day, Dr. Mason received from Candy an
assortment of records and documents. Within minutes, Dr. Mason
turned them over to his attorney. The following day, summons were
served upon Kasmir and Candy ordering Kasmir to give up the docu-
ments and Candy to testify about them. Both men refused to comply
with the summons, and the government sought enforcement in the
district court. The district court granted the government's petition, but
stayed its order pending appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held, reversed: The constitutional privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination may be invoked on behalf of a taxpayer by his
attorney to prevent the production of documents which the taxpayer
has turned over to his attorney. United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444
(5th Cir. 1974).'
In resolving the issues presented by the instant case, the court
sought guidance from the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Couch v. United States, 2 and from its own pronouncements in
United States v. White. 3 In Couch, the taxpayer had hired an inde-
pendent accountant to whom she had regularly delivered various busi-
ness and tax records. The IRS sought to enforce its summons to view
these records which had remained in the accountant's possession for
many years. The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer was not
entitled to assert her privilege against self-incrimination to prevent
production of the records which she had turned over to her
accountant. 4 The Court determined that "possession bears the closest
relationship to the personal compulsion forbidden by the Fifth
Amendment,"5 and found that the taxpayer's "divestment of posses-
sion was of such a character as to disqualify her entirely as an object of
any impermissible Fifth Amendment compulsion. ' 6 The Court also
decided that there could be no expectation of privacy when records
were turned over to an accountant for disclosure in an income tax
return. 7 The Couch Court was careful to point out that it was not
establishing a per se rule as to the necessity of possession in order to
assert the fifth amendment privilege; the Court acknowledged that
situations might arise "where constructive possession is so clear . . . as
1. The Court held that the Internal Revenue Service was entitled to enforce the summons
served upon accountant Candy if it believed this would be of benefit to the government.
2. 409 U.S. 322 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as Couch].
3. 477 F.2d 757, aff'd on rehearing en banc, 487 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1973) [hereinafter
referred to as White].
4. This decision has received much criticism as sanctioning "yet another tool of the ever-
widening governmental invasion and oversight of our private lives." Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 338 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Comment, 1973, UTAH L. REV. 106; 48
TUL. L. REV. 160 (1973); 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 142 (1973).
5. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 331 (1973).
6. Id. at 334-35.
7. Id. at 335. The Court noted that, although not in itself a controlling factor, no
confidential accountant-client privilege exists under federal law.
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to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially
intact. "8
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had its first opportu-
nity to apply the Couch decision in United States v. White. 9 The
taxpayer in White, upon learning that he was the subject of an
Internal Revenue Service investigation, retained White as counsel.
White immediately contacted the taxpayer's accountant and obtained
all worksheets used in preparing the taxpayer's returns. Summons was
served upon White for production of those documents. White refused
to comply, asserting his client's fifth amendment privilege. Two issues
faced the court: 1) whether an attorney has standing in an Internal
Revenue proceeding to assert a privilege on behalf of his client, and 2)
whether the fifth amendment shields a client from compulsory produc-
tion of work papers owned and prepared by an accountant and in the
possession of the taxpayer's attorney, but never in the actual posses-
sion of the taxpayer. The court assumed, without actually deciding the
issue, that attorney White did have standing to assert any privilege his
client might have. However, the court then held that the privilege,
under the circumstances, did not exist. It reasoned that because the
taxpayer was not in possession of the documents, the necessary ele-
ment of personal compulsion, as prescribed in Couch, was missing.
The court rejected the taxpayer's claim of constructive possession, as
suggested in Couch, maintaining that an attorney could not be in
constructive possession of the papers for his client when the client
never had actual possession of them.' 0
Confronted with the White decision, attorney Kasmir successfully
distinguished the instant case. His client, unlike the taxpayer in White,
had obtained actual possession of the worksheets and had personally
transferred the documents to Kasmir pursuant to an attorney-client
relationship. The court correctly held that under these facts, the tax-
payer was entitled to assert his privilege against self-incrimination to
prevent production of the documents. It found that the taxpayer had a
legitimate expectation of privacy based on the nature of the attorney-
client relationship," which is guaranteed by the sixth amendment
right to counsel, the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, 12 and ethical
restraints on the attorney. 3 The court also determined that under
8. Id. at 333.
9. 477 F.2d 757, qffd on rehearing en banc, 487 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1973).
10. Contra, United States v. White, 487 F.2d 1335, 1339-40, aff'd en banc, 477 F.2d 757 (5th
Cir. 1973) (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
11. The attorney-client relationship as distinguished from the attorney-client privilege.
12. But note that the attorney-client privilege is not available to prevent production of
documents created prior to the attorney-client relationship. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2307
(McNaughton rev. 1961). See Comment, 74 YALE L.J. 539 (1965) for recommendations that in
cases such as this, the court look to expansion of the attorney-client privilege for a non-
constitutional rationale.
13. The attorney has a strict ethical obligation to prevent disclosure. This ethical obligation
is broader than, and independent of, the attorney-client privilege. 499 F.2d at 453.
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these circumstances, the attorney was in constructive possession of the
papers for his client.
In its analysis, the court recognized that unless a taxpayer retains
his fifth amendment privilege to prevent production of documents
which he has transferred to his attorney, his rights are effectively
decreased by the transfer. 14 Since taxpayers are often dependent upon
their attorneys to decipher today's complex tax laws, and therefore
must deliver their records to them, the practical effect of denial of the
privilege would be virtual elimination of the protection against self-
incrimination in criminal tax investigations. 15 The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in Kasmir, rejected the government's contentions which
would have led to such consequences.16
Having determined that a taxpayer retains his privilege to prevent
the production of documents in his attorney's possession, the court
answered in the affirmative the question left unanswered in White:
whether the attorney has standing to assert his client's claim of
privilege. The court recognized that the "realities of tax litigation
require that the attorney be allowed to press his client's claim where
the client could successfully do so.' 17
The decision in Kasmir clarified the position taken by the Fifth
Circuit in White, and considerably limited that decision. Many com-
mentators expressed fears that after the White decision a taxpayer
would automatically lose his fifth amendment privilege in documents
when his attorney took possession of them. 18 It is now clear that if the
proper procedure is followed, no such loss of privilege will result.
Unfortunately, by distinguishing White rather than overruling it, the
Kasmir court makes it
appear as if the applicability of the privilege is more a
matter of the form of the transfer than the substance behind
the privilege since the most important difference between this
case and White is taxpayer's fleeting actual possession be-
tween that of the accountant and that of the attorney. 19
The court rationalized its decision by asserting that it was merely
permitting the taxpayer in Kasmir to retain his privilege while the
taxpayer in White, never having had possession of the documents, had
no privilege to retain.20 Such contrived reasoning is unpersuasive. It
leaves a constitutional guarantee dependent upon the ritualistic touch-
ing of the documents by the taxpayer. The decision is therefore con-
14. "The government would have us hold that the taxpayer walked into his attorney's office
unquestionably shielded with the amendment's protection, and walked out with something less."
499 F.2d at 452 n.5, quoting United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 466 (1963).
15. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 342 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
16. 499 F.2d at 452.
17. Id. at 454.
18. See, e.g., 1973 DUKE L.J. 1080.
19. 499 F.2d at 451.
20. Id. at 453-54.
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trary to the policy that the privilege against self-incrimination is to be
liberally construed and applied. 2 I Regardless of the manner in which
an attorney obtains possession of tax records and documents, it should
be recognized that he possesses them constructively for his client in
order to prepare his client's defense.
Of course, it must be noted, the court was not forced to overrule
White in order to reach a proper and just decision in Kasmir. Hope-
fully, when the Fifth Circuit is again faced with a situation in which
the taxpayer has not actually touched the documents en route to his
attorney, it will acknowledge that such a slight distinction from Kas-
mir does not justify denial of the taxpayer's privilege. Today, a careful
attorney can insure that his client's privilege will not be jeopardized by
involving the taxpayer in any transfer of documents to him.
The Kasmir decision is an important one, 22 necessary to the
safeguard of constitutional guarantees and protection of the attorney-
client relationship. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that the Supreme
Court's pronouncements in Couch do not defeat the taxpayer's claim of
privilege with respect to documents in his attorney's possession, but
rather, serve to strengthen that claim.2 3 It is to be hoped that other
circuits will follow the Kasmir court in its protection of the rights of
taxpayers.
ELLEN R. GERSHOW
DISCLOSURE OF CLIENT CONFIDENCES BY SECURITIES
ATTORNEY NAMED AS A DEFENDANT IN A CIVIL
ACTION DOES NOT VIOLATE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Can an attorney, who is named as a defendant in a civil action
along with his former corporate client, reveal client confidences to
plaintiffs' counsel? Should plaintiffs' counsel be disqualified from par-
ticipating in the suit on the grounds that he has received such
21. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
22. The field of taxation represents probably the greatest single area of contact between
individuals and the force of the state. A slight invasion of the right against self-
incrimination in this field has as great and baleful consequences upon the relations
between the individual and the state as does an invasion of that right in the more
dramatic areas of public life.
Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 103 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
23. But cf. United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974), a post-Couch decision
involving the same fact pattern as Kasmir but dealing with a non-criminal investigation. Cases
which dealt with this issue prior to Couch include United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.
1963); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th
Cir. 1961); United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d
860 (3d Cir. 1959); Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
